Many observers believe that regime change, the forcible removal of foreign leaders by external actors, is a viable tool for supplanting corrupt and unpopular governments. Whether by backing the CIA-backed ouster of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-backed intervention in Libya, American officials have argued that regime change can reduce human rights abuses, advance democracy, and promote economic development and stability. Yet, the historical record shows that armed regime-change missions rarely succeed as intended and often produce unintended consequences.
These results suggest that the conventional wisdom about regime change is flawed. Policymakers ignore the risks of long and costly institution-building missions, and they focus on desirability rather than estimating the full resources required to make a policy work. They also overlook the risk of unintended consequences, such as triggering a power vacuum and the empowerment of extremist factions.
Academic debates about the causes of regime change often pit two modes of explanation against each other: micro-arguments (e.g., that the government in question does not serve its citizens) against macro-arguments (e.g., institutional history and economic development). These debates fail to recognize that micro-arguments and macro-arguments are interconnected: a country’s predisposition toward a particular type of regime may be determined by its institutions but can be triggered by micro-events that disrupt those institutions.
Moreover, the claim that regime change is necessary for democracy promotion is flawed because it rests on uncertain developments in the law of recognition and a logically attractive but normatively weak connection between a regime’s democratic bona fides and its standing to object to external interference. Indeed, the overuse of regime change undermines the effectiveness of other foreign policy tools that can enhance freedom and improve human security around the world, and it harms America’s relations with its peer competitors.